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Summary 
 
This article reconstructs a significant historical alternative to the theories of ‘cosmopolitan’ or 
‘liberal’ patriotism often associated with the Scottish Enlightenment.  Instead of focusing on 
the work of Andrew Fletcher, Francis Hutcheson, David Hume or Adam Smith, this study 
concentrates on the theories of sociability, patriotism and international rivalry elaborated by 
Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) and Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782).  Centrally, the 
article reconstructs both thinkers’ shared perspective on what I have called ‘unsociable’ or 
‘agonistic’ patriotism, an eighteenth-century idiom which saw international rivalship, 
antagonism, and even war as crucial in generating political cohesion and sustaining moral 
virtue.  Placing their thinking in the context of wider eighteenth-century debates about 
sociability and state formation, the article’s broader purpose is to highlight the centrality of 
controversies about human sociability to eighteenth-century debates about the nature of 
international relations. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Some of the most interesting recent work on the ‘Scottish Enlightenment’ has emphasised the 
extent to which Scottish thinkers sought to understand the psychological foundations of 
patriotism and cosmopolitanism, and to reconcile the two in benign and politically viable 
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ways.  For example, scholars have underlined the significance of Andrew Fletcher of 
Saltoun’s analysis of international relations at the dawn of the eighteenth century, identifying 
in his thought a brand of cosmopolitan republicanism which found expression in a call for the 
reform of the European state system.  Fletcher was a cosmopolitan patriot because he 
explicitly argued that the interest of ‘every distinct society’ should be guided by the ‘interest 
of mankind’.2  More recently, several scholars have drawn attention to cosmopolitan themes 
in Adam Smith’s moral, political and economic thought, describing Smith’s ‘commercial’ or 
‘economic’ cosmopolitanism as an alternative to strong versions of moral cosmopolitanism as 
well as to narrower, exclusivist conceptions of patriotism.
3
  One outcome of this research has 
been the recovery of a distinctively ‘Enlightened’ or ‘liberal’ theory of patriotism in the 
writings of Smith, along with those of his friend David Hume.
4
  Although both Hume and 
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4
  Hume defended a moderate form of love of country as compatible with the general interest 
of mankind.  Nevertheless, he thought that love of country easily degenerated into national 
prejudice or excessive national partiality.  This, he argued, was a particular problem in mid-
eighteenth-century Britain following the War of the Austrian Succession.  As he wrote in his 
1752 essay ‘Of the Balance of Power’, the people of Britain were ‘animated with such a 
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Smith recognised that a cosmopolitan ‘love of mankind’ was a weakly motivating principle 
of human nature, both searched for ways of tempering the most malign expressions of 
national animosity in modern politics and, in Smith’s famous formulation, of separating the 
‘mean’ principle of national prejudice from the ‘noble’ principle of love of country.5 
 
The purpose of this article is to reconstruct a significant Scottish alternative to both the 
‘cosmopolitan’ patriotism of Fletcher and the ‘liberal’ or Enlightened patriotism of Hume and 
Smith.  Focusing on the theories of sociability and international rivalry elaborated by Adam 
Ferguson (1723-1816) and Henry Home, Lord Kames (1696-1782), the article reconstructs 
their shared perspective on what I have called ‘unsociable’ or ‘agonistic’ patriotism, an idiom 
which had several distinctive components.
6
  First of all, both Ferguson and Kames laid 
special emphasis on the ‘unsociable’ characteristics of human nature, which in turn explained 
the enmities that characterised relations between independent societies.  The point here was 
not that human beings were naturally ‘selfish’ or egoistic – an emphasis on self-love was very 
prominent in both Hume and Smith – but rather that human nature was characterised by a 
principle of ‘dissension’, ‘animosity’, or ‘aversion’ that had significant consequences for 
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understanding international politics.  Furthermore, Ferguson and Kames both offered positive 
verdicts on the formative role of the ‘rivalship and competition of nations’ as a foundation of 
the ‘national spirit’ (this was one of the key conceptual terms in both Ferguson’s 1767 Essay 
on the History of Civil Society and Kames’s 1774 Sketches of the History of Man).  On this 
view, not only national rivalry and emulation, but even national prejudice, national jealousy 
and – in extremis – war could serve beneficial moral and political ends in securing the 
vigilance and patriotic cohesion of nations.  Finally, this understanding of the dynamics of 
antagonism and competition among independent states underpinned a positive vision of 
Europe’s future as a balanced system of militarily-prepared and patriotic nations.  In place of 
eighteenth-century views of Europe as a pacified league of commercial states, Ferguson and 
Kames proposed a balance of equal-sized nations characterised by healthy rivalry and 
patriotic discord. 
 
It should be emphasised from the outset that this idiom of unsociable or ‘agonistic’ patriotism 
represented a partial but significant revision of the highly influential account of natural 
sociability set out by the Ulster-born Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746), professor of moral 
philosophy at the University of Glasgow between 1729 and 1746.  Hutcheson is significant in 
this story as a point of departure for almost all significant subsequent Scottish thinkers, 
including Hume, Smith, Kames and Ferguson.  In the sequence of works he produced in the 
1720s and 1730s, Hutcheson had set out to refute the ‘selfish’ systems of Thomas Hobbes 
and Bernard Mandeville, replying to Hobbes that the state of nature was not a state of 
‘violence, war, and rapine’ but one of ‘peace and good-will, of innocence and beneficence.’7  
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Hutcheson’s identification of a natural capacity for patriotism formed part of this broader 
argument about the natural sociability and benevolence of man.  In his influential Inquiry into 
the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), Hutcheson wrote very positively of 
‘national Love, and the dear Idea of a Country’.8  He underlined that devotion to the ‘publick 
Good’ was universally a source of moral approbation, citing the admiration aroused by the 
Dutch republican patriots in their struggles against imperial Spain.
9
  The shared experience of 
‘natural affections and kind passions’, he wrote elsewhere, was a powerful motivating force 
which could ‘rouse men into another kind of love for their country, and resolution in its 
defence.’10  At the same time, Hutcheson insisted on the compatibility between a properly-
oriented patriotism and a more cosmopolitan ‘love of Mankind’.  Echoing the ancient Stoic 
concept of oikeōsis, Hutcheson argued that human sociability found expression in concentric 
‘Systems’ that ultimately encompassed the entirety of mankind.  Although the intensity of 
benevolent affections, like gravity, diminished with distance, human beings were capable of a 
disinterested ‘universal Benevolence’ for all rational and moral beings (including, he 
conjectured, any intelligent beings on undiscovered planets).
11
  The crucial outcome was that 
‘love of country’ was by no means ‘exclusive’ in character.  As Hutcheson wrote in the 
passage of the Inquiry dealing with the foundations of ‘national Love’: 
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Whatever place we have liv’d in for any considerable time, there we have  most 
distinctly remark’d the various Affections of human Nature; we have known many 
lovely Characters; we remember the Associations, Friendships, Familys, natural 
Affections, and other human Sentiments; our moral Sense determines us to approve 
these lovely Dispositions where we have most distinctly observ’d them; and our 
Benevolence concerns us in the Interests of the Persons possess’d of them.  When we 
come to observe the like as distinctly in another Country, we begin to acquire a 
national Love toward it also; nor has our own Country any other preference in our 
Idea, unless it be by an Association of the pleasant Ideas of our Youth, with the 
Buildings, Fields, and Woods where we receiv’d them.12 
 
While Ferguson and Kames were every bit as critical of the ‘selfish’ theories of Hobbes and 
Mandeville as Hutcheson had been, both of them made an important amendment to 
Hutcheson’s perspective on sociable patriotism.  Instead of seeing patriotism as part-and-
parcel of a broader set of natural affections that (ultimately) encompassed the whole of 
mankind, Ferguson’s and Kames’s insistence on the unsociable characteristics of human 
nature pointed to severe difficulties in reconciling patriotic allegiance with cosmopolitan 
sentiments.  The claim developed in this article is that Ferguson’s and Kames’s conceptions 
of mankind’s ‘unsocial’ sociability ultimately represented a significant historical rival to the 
more conventional picture of human natural sociability that ran through much eighteenth-
century moral thought.  Their assessment of sociability’s curiously Janus-faced character 
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means that their writings should be appreciated as significant eighteenth-century theorisations 
of what Immanuel Kant was in the 1780s to term mankind’s ‘unsocial sociability’.13  
 
My argument proceeds as follows.  The first three sections of the article reconstruct 
Ferguson’s account of ‘unsocial’ sociability and its implications for his analysis of 
international relations, the history of civil society, and his vision of patriotism itself.  
Conceiving his theory of sociability as a response to Hobbes, Montesquieu, Rousseau and 
Hutcheson, these sections reconstruct his depiction of international society as one driven by 
perpetual discord, which worked positively to create domestic union and concord.  The fourth 
and fifth parts of the article concentrate on Kames’s Sketches of the History of Mankind.  
These sections explore the moral psychology underpinning Kames’s vision of a modernized 
amor patriae, which he saw as the essential quality of a free state and an urgent requirement 
for Britain in the 1770s.  I argue that Kames shared a good deal of Ferguson’s own 
perspective on the positive value of national animosity (which Kames called ‘aversion’), and 
offered some further speculations on the danger of a fully pacified world.  The article’s 
broader purpose is to highlight the centrality of controversies about human sociability to the 
moral and political thought of the Scottish Enlightenment, and to eighteenth-century debates 
about the nature of international relations.
14
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2. Ferguson on unsocial sociability 
 
One of the most distinctive contributions to the eighteenth-century Scottish debate about 
patriotism was set out by Adam Ferguson, Professor of Moral Philosophy and Pneumatics at 
the University of Edinburgh between 1764 and 1785.  Patriotism loomed large in Ferguson’s 
teaching at Edinburgh, where he described it as one of the crucial constituents of the 
‘happiness of a people’.  In his lecture course, first summarised for publication in his 1769 
Institutes of Moral Philosophy, he had adopted the language of republican patriotism, 
describing equal citizenship and the subordination of private to public interests as crucial 
foundations of love of country.
15
  Yet the most distinctive aspects of Ferguson’s thinking 
about patriotism derived from his emphatic insistence on the permanence and intensity of 
antagonism and enmity between independent nations.  This view was a consequence of the 
underlying theory of human sociability he had set out in his Essay on the History of Civil 
Society (1767), and in his other published and unpublished works.   
 
As I have argued elsewhere, the central feature of Ferguson’s own theory of sociability was 
its strong emphasis on war and animosity as principles of social integration.
16
  According to 
Ferguson, human nature itself was marked equally by propensities to love and fear, friendship 
and animosity, and what he called ‘union’ and ‘dissension’.  He insisted on this point with 
remarkable consistency throughout all his works, although it found clearest expression in the 
opening sections of the Essay on the History of Civil Society.  In the course of dismantling the 
depictions of mankind’s natural state set out by Hobbes and Rousseau, Ferguson elaborated 
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an alternative vision of human natural sociability.  It was a mistake to assume, he wrote, that 
sociability was a consequence of either fear or love, or of amity or war.  Instead, human 
beings had always been ‘mutual objects of both fear and love’ to each other.  Futhermore, 
Ferguson dismissed the individualist starting point of the contractualist tradition in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political theory: mankind had always existed in groups.
17
  
These facts ensured that the dynamics of human association – in tribes, communities, or 
nations – were inseparable from the rivalries and antagonisms generated towards outsiders.  
As Ferguson put it: ‘Our attachment to one division, or to one sect, seems often to derive 
much of its force from an animosity conceived to an opposite one: and this animosity in its 
turn, as often arises from a zeal in behalf of the side we espouse, and from a desire to 
vindicate the rights of our party.’18 
 
The central features of this way of thinking about the dynamics of human association 
survived unchanged throughout Ferguson’s works between the 1770s and 1790s.  His core 
idea, that human nature was characterised simultaneously by the opposed tendencies of 
friendship and animosity, appeared frequently in both the published and unpublished versions 
of his Edinburgh University lectures on pneumatics and moral philosophy.  What is perhaps 
most remarkable about these texts was his systematic insistence that man’s natural state had 
always been, and would remain, one of war and antagonism.  In a lecture of November 1779, 
for example, he argued that the individual was ‘destined to have his Antagonist as well as 
Associate’, and to ‘have among his fellow Creatures Objects of Animosity and Distrust as 
well as Friendship’.  He noted explicitly that ‘Man is by Nature in a State of War as well as 
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of Amity’.19  In a subsequent lecture of 1779, he taught that ‘in the History of human 
Nature…Man appears destined to War as well as Peace & Amity’.20  Sociability, in this 
sense, was a principle of division as well as union: 
 
The Tendency of human Nature is not to Universal Confederacy.  But to separate 
Groupes & Partial Societys in which attachment to one Party is often the source of 
Animosity to another.  And in this sense Society may be said to divide as well as to 
unite the Species.
21
 
 
This quotation was an explicit statement of the ‘unsociable’ consequences of sociability 
itself.  As Ferguson concluded in his discussion of this topic in the Principles of Moral and 
Political Science, the ‘possibility of discord and war,’ was ‘entailed upon human nature’.22 
 
It is important to situate this way of thinking about the dynamics of human association 
against earlier contributions to the eighteenth-century debate about sociability.  On the one 
hand, Ferguson differed from those like Hobbes and Rousseau who had denied human natural 
sociability altogether.  There was nothing artificial or derivative about the intense bonds that 
characterised the tribes or communities into which mankind were naturally divided.  On the 
other hand, the emphasis on war and antagonism distinguished Ferguson’s position from that 
of Hutcheson, who was unprepared to concede a natural principle of war or aggression.  
Ferguson’s discussion can also be situated against wider eighteenth-century debates about the 
precise sequencing of the balance between sociability and war in the history of state 
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formation.  This question had been investigated by Montesquieu in Book 1 of The Spirit of 
the Laws, in which Montesquieu had argued that the ‘state of war’ began only after the 
establishment of societies (and not, as Hobbes had maintained, in the state of nature itself.)  
Montesquieu effectively historicised, but also reversed, Hobbes’s understanding of the 
relevance of war to the formation of societies.
23
  Rousseau followed many aspects of 
Montesquieu’s critique of Hobbes, although Rousseau restricted the emergence of the ‘state 
of war’ to the establishment of what he called ‘the social state’.  As Rousseau underlined in 
his manuscript ‘The State of War’, war was an outcome, rather than the cause, of the 
formation of separate, artificial political societies across the globe.  It is noteworthy that one 
of the titles Rousseau originally considered for this manuscript was ‘That the State of War 
Arises from the Social State’.24  Although the details of Ferguson’s position were different 
from those of both Montesquieu and Rousseau (I shall say more about this later), it makes 
sense to view his contribution as part of this larger body of work on the relationship between 
sociability and war.  It was a feature of Ferguson’s work that made it part of the broader 
eighteenth-century debate on unsocial sociability. 
 
 
3. Ferguson on the ‘rivalship and competition’ of nations 
 
There was a direct connection between Ferguson’s theory of human sociability and his 
depiction of the character of the international order.  He repeatedly insisted that the truncated 
character of sociability meant that a ‘plurality of nations’ would remain a permanent fixture 
of the international landscape.  Furthermore, relations between independent nations would 
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6-9.  
24
  Rousseau, ‘The State of War’, in Rousseau, The Social Contract, 167, 307. 
12 
 
inevitably be characterised by significant levels of enmity or animosity.  In support of this 
position, Ferguson cited one of the earliest statements of a ‘realist’ position in international 
relations: the claim by Cleinias (the Cretan) in Plato’s Laws that ‘for everyone throughout the 
whole of life an endless war exists against all cities’.25  He repeated this insight in the context 
of the French revolutionary wars in 1802, noting that it was ‘wise to consider the longest 
Peace but as a long Truce and a time of preparation for War’.26  In the Institutes of Moral 
Philosophy, Ferguson identified differences of manners and customs as one of the causes that 
generated such ‘contempt and aversion’ among neighbouring nations.27  But his main point 
was simply that national rivalries would remain a permanent fact of international life. 
 
This picture of permanent and natural enmity among independent nations was a prominent 
feature of the history of mankind set out in the Essay.  Referring to the almost constant 
divisions among ‘rude nations’ (savages and barbarians), Ferguson argued that ‘in barbarous 
times, mankind, being generally divided into small parties, are engaged in almost perpetual 
hostilities’.  He noted ‘the repugnance to union, the frequent wars, or rather the perpetual 
hostilities, which take place among rude nations and separate clans’, which showed ‘how 
much our species is disposed to opposition, as well as to concert.’  Primitive tribes were, he 
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War, the Quest for Peace’, Journal of Military Ethics, 1 (2002), 36-44; Victor Alonso, ‘War, 
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claimed, quite capable of establishing temporary confederacies for security or for conquest.  
But once immediate emergencies had passed, ‘they easily separate again, and act on the 
maxims of rival states.’  Nevertheless, violent national prejudices and animosities were by no 
means the monopoly of rude nations alone.  Ferguson invited his readers to consider the 
‘prejudices and national passions’ among the populations on either side of the Pyrenees, the 
Rhine, or the Channel, claiming that ‘it is among them that we find the materials of war and 
dissension laid without the direction of government, and sparks ready to kindle into a flame, 
which the statesmen is frequently disposed to extinguish.’28  This, interestingly, was an early 
statement of the ways in which popular national sentiments and ‘prejudices’ might trump the 
rational or prudent pursuit of politics in the national interest.  As Ferguson pointed out, the 
strength of patriotic passions could easily overwhelm calculations of ‘reasons of state’. 
 
Ferguson drew two central conclusions about the role of war and international animosity for 
domestic politics.  First, like many other thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, he suggested 
that war between separate societies formed the historical context for the emergence of civil 
government.  Hume had made similar points as part of his own critique of Lockean social 
contract theory, suggesting that the first rudiments of civil authority developed because 
societies learned from the benefits of undivided command during warfare.
29
  Ferguson made 
this kind of insight a cornerstone of his theoretical history of the state or civil society.  As he 
wrote, ‘without the rivalship of nations, and the practice of war, civil society itself could 
hardly have found an object, or a form...The necessity of a public defence, has given rise to 
many departments of state, and the intellectual talents of men have found their busiest scene 
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in wielding their national forces’.30  In making this claim, he also reversed Rousseau’s 
argument that war was a consequence, rather than a cause, of the formation of the political 
state and the rise of an individualised property-based regime.
31
  The state was a product of 
war between pre-existing social groupings, not vice-versa. 
 
The second point was that rivalship and antagonism served a crucial purpose in stimulating 
the civil and military virtues and in forging a vital ‘national spirit’. Ferguson consistently 
stressed that conflict, struggle and rivalry played a crucial role in the moral formation of the 
individual.  By extension, the antagonisms and rivalries unleashed during warfare were 
compatible with the exercise of mankind’s highest talents and virtues: ‘the best qualities of 
men, their candour, as well as their resolution, may operate in the midst of their quarrels.’32 
This meant that war itself could not be depicted as an unalloyed catastrophe.  War was simply 
one of the many routes by which humans could depart from the stage of life.
33
  Furthermore, 
patriotic wars were compatible with both collective virtue and public happiness.  As Ferguson 
wrote in the Principles, it would be ‘folly, in reasoning of mankind, to consider the time of 
necessary war as a period of misery, or the period of peace as of course a season of 
happiness.  In either conjuncture, the vices and follies of men may predominate; but, in either 
conjuncture, also, men have occasion to exercise their best affections and faculties; and, by 
this alone, the prevalence of good or ill, of public happiness or misery, can safely be 
determined’.34 
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The broader point was that emulation and rivalry were essential guardians of the patriotic 
cohesion that Ferguson took to be crucial to the health and dynamism of civil society.  As he 
wrote in the Essay, it was ‘vain to expect that we can give to the multitude of the people a 
sense of union among themselves, without admitting hostility to those who oppose them.  
Could we at once, in the case of any nation, extinguish the emulation which is excited from 
abroad, we should probably break or weaken the bands of society at home, and close the 
busiest scene of national occupations and virtues.’35  There was a significant sense here in 
which Ferguson’s idea of ‘unsocial sociability’, in a somewhat different way to that of Kant, 
worked to promote the patriotic cohesion and moral flourishing of independent nations: 
‘What threatened to ruin and overset every good disposition in the human breast, what 
seemed to banish justice from the societies of men, tends to unite the species in clans and 
fraternities; formidable, indeed, and hostile to one another, but in the domestic society of 
each, faithful, disinterested, and generous.’36  A similar set of claims appeared in the 
Principles of Moral and Political Science (1792).  Here Ferguson noted that ‘the members of 
each separate nation feel their connection the more, that the name of a fellow-countryman 
stands in contradistinction to an alien.’  Again, he noted the ‘force with which nature has 
directed rival nations to pull against one another,’ but also stressed how much these 
apparently divisive forces tended ‘to unite them in leagues more extensive than they would 
otherwise form.’37 
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These insights were at the core of Ferguson’s theory of ‘agonistic’ patriotism, in which 
rivalship and even enmity between separate nations were seen as preferable to the 
disinterested ‘impartiality’ or extensive ‘love of mankind’ suggested by advocates of 
Enlightenment cosmopolitanism.  Here Ferguson is best seen as reworking an old theme, 
expressed by writers from Juvenal to Machiavelli and Montaigne, which saw rivalship, 
enmity and discordia among separate communities as the main guarantee of virtue and 
political cohesion.
38
  For example, in his History of the Progress and Termination of the 
Roman Republic, first published in 1783, Ferguson praised Scipio’s famous argument against 
the destruction of Carthage on the grounds that a powerful rival in Rome’s vicinity would 
‘maintain the vigilance of state and the emulation of national virtue.’39  This order of 
priorities also resulted in a striking argument about the dangers of adopting a posture of 
neutrality or impartiality in international relations.  As Ferguson wrote in his 1776 pamphlet 
responding to Richard Price at the outset of the American war of independence, impartiality 
was a doubtful virtue ‘when the cause of our country is at stake’.40  Repeating the point in the 
1792 Principles, he insisted that ‘Indifference, more than candour, is likely to produce the 
appearance of impartiality, when the cause of our friend, or our country, is at stake.’41  These 
claims remind us that Ferguson’s writings on patriotism were shaped by his opposition to the 
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political arguments of contemporaries like Price, who had advocated a more ‘cosmopolitan’ 
response to the conflict with the American colonists. 
 
 
4. Ferguson on the balance of Europe 
 
Ferguson’s account of ‘agonistic patriotism’ underpinned a distinctive vision of the 
eighteenth-century European state system.  Although he produced no single text outlining this 
vision in detail, it is possible to discern in his writings a reasonably coherent argument about 
the appropriate institutional and political structures for Europe’s states and, more specifically, 
about the urgent need to maintain patriotism and military commitment among modern 
European ‘nations’.  Crucially, Ferguson argued that Europe’s transformation into a realm of 
pacified commercial states was undermining patriotism and promoting stagnation, corruption 
and decline.  Claiming that the economic and political trajectories of modern states would 
end in the establishment of wealthy but despotic regimes on the model of eighteenth-century 
China, he questioned the widespread eighteenth-century view that Europe’s commercial and 
cultural development would ultimately favour stability and even the cosmopolitan value of 
peace.
42
  He also argued that a balance of commercial monarchies, competing purely 
economically, left Europe vulnerable to imperialism or conquest.  Against this background, 
Ferguson argued that a balance of patriotic nations, with militarily-prepared citizenries, 
would secure Europe’s stability and liberty far better than the unstable commercial states and 
military monarchies that currently made up the system.  According to this vision, the virtuous 
rivalry and healthy antagonism of independent and roughly equal-sized nations would 
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constitute a firm guarantee against empire and also act as a brake upon the morally and 
politically tranquilising effects of doux commerce. 
 
The immediate implication of Ferguson’s idea of patriotism was the need to maintain a 
plurality of states in Europe.  As he noted in the section of the Essay entitled ‘Of the 
Influences of Climate and Situation’, the division of Europe into distinct and independent 
communities had been one of the principal motors of civilization and a key to the progress of 
the arts and sciences.  This was, in effect, a claim about the central role of national rivalry in 
driving forward the historical progress of Europe.  According to Ferguson, 
 
 Among the advantages which enable nations to run the career of policy, as well as of 
arts, it may be expected, from the observations already made, that we should reckon 
every circumstance which enables them to divide and to maintain themselves in 
distinct and independent communities.  The society and concourse of other men, are 
not more necessary to form the individual, than the rivalship and competition of 
nations are to invigorate the principles of political life in the state…The distinction of 
states being clearly maintained, a principle of political life is established in every 
division, and the capital of every district, like the heart in an animal body, 
communicates with ease the vital blood and the national spirit to its members.
43
 
 
The single most important concept structuring Ferguson’s suggestion for the best model of 
European politics was that of emulation.  This focus on emulation aligned him with other key 
thinkers in Scotland, including Hume and Smith and, as we shall see, Kames.  As Istvan Hont 
has argued, both Hume and Smith advocated ‘emulation’ instead of ‘envy’ as the guiding 
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moral principle for European economic development.  In practical terms, this entailed 
replacing economic policies rooted in ‘jealousy’ (such as counter-productive commercial 
tariffs) with a more healthy focus on domestic economic development and peaceful trade.
44
  
Ferguson shared this emphasis on the positive psychological (and economic) benefits of 
emulation, although he was more prepared than Hume or Smith to countenance the domestic 
political benefits of ‘jealousy’ and even ‘enmity’. 
 
Ferguson’s account of mankind’s unsocial sociability ultimately found expression in an 
argument for the maintenance of a balance of power among militarily and politically equal 
states, which would preserve emulation, the ‘national spirit’ and the ‘liberties of mankind’.  
This insistence on the balance of power as the best model for preserving European vitality 
distinguished Ferguson’s writing from some of the more farsighted eighteenth-century 
projects for the reorganisation of Europe, of which the most famous Scottish example was 
Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun’s proposal for a Europe of small-scale republican federations.  
There remained a good deal of interest in Fletcher’s cosmopolitan proposal for a federation of 
small and non-aggressive states in the period in which Ferguson was writing, and into the 
1790s.
45
  Nevertheless, Ferguson’s view of human nature, and the permanence of national 
antagonisms, committed him to a different vision of Europe’s future.  He suggested that 
emulation, respect and even fear between equal patriotic nations was a much better guarantee 
of the overall liberties of Europe than cosmopolitan proposals for perpetual peace.  According 
to Ferguson, ‘where a number of states are contiguous, they should be near an equality, in 
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order that they may be mutually objects of respect and consideration, and in order that they 
may possess that independence in which the political life of a nation consists.’  Furthermore, 
‘in every state, the freedom of its members depends on the balance and adjustment of its 
interior parts; and the existence of such freedom among mankind, depends upon the balance 
of nations.’  Finally, the ‘continuance of emulation among states, must depend on the degree 
of equality by which their forces are balanced; or on the incentives by which either party, or 
all, are urged to continue their struggles.’46  Later, in his Principles of Moral and Political 
Science, Ferguson explicitly connected this ideal of military preparedness and armed 
emulation to the maintenance of peace and stability at the international level: 
 
War is justly avoided, and peace among mankind is admitted to be a supreme object 
of consideration and desire: But we must not therefore enjoin it as an article of 
wisdom for nations to discontinue their military policy, and to neglect preparations for 
their own defence.  These are often the surest preservatives of peace, and, joined to a 
scrupulous attention to abstain from wrongs or unnecessary provocations, are all that 
the most pacific nation can do to avoid the mischiefs of war.
47
 
 
The continued significance of Ferguson’s thinking about patriotism and international 
competition is perhaps best illustrated by his response to the French Revolution in the 1790s 
and early 1800s.  In his unpublished essays ‘Of Statesmen and Warriours’ and ‘On the French 
Revolution and its Still Impending Consequences’ (written between 1803 and 1808) he 
underlined the ease with which the French revolutionary republic had ‘trampled on all the 
former military establishments’ of Europe and had risen to the ‘unprecedented dominion of 
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nations formerly supposed invincible’.48  France’s expansion revealed the weaknesses of the 
existing balance of power among Europe’s machine-like commercial states, which proved no 
match for the intense patriotic energies unleashed by the revolution.  Ferguson explained that 
France’s success vis-à-vis the other European powers was less a product of ‘discipline’ or 
strategy than the intense patriotic commitment of the population: the ‘Effects of a National 
Spirit roused to uncommon exertion by revolutionary prospects of Elevation & Glory’.49  He 
made a similar point in an 1802 letter to Henry Dundas, claiming that it was ‘not the use of 
Arms but the National Spirit that has of late decided the Fortune of Europe’.50  Ferguson’s 
ideas about the invigorating effects of international enmity also led him to suggest that 
European statesmen should have avoided at all costs the military provocation of France.  Left 
to its own devices, the young French republic would have collapsed in factional infighting at 
home.  But the threat of war from abroad ‘was in reality an admonition to Suspend this [sic] 
dissensions and Waste their dangerous powers on the Frontier.’51  Ferguson’s analysis of the 
politics of republican expansion in the 1790s and early 1800s was thus entirely congruent 
with his the logic of his earlier thinking about patriotism and international politics.  
 
 
5. Lord Kames on sociability and aversion 
 
A number of significant parallels with Ferguson’s analysis of sociability and patriotism can 
be found in the writings of Henry Home, Lord Kames.  Kames was a thinker of wide-ranging 
interests: his works encompassed the history of law and jurisprudence (especially in 
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Scotland), aesthetics, moral theory, and the ‘history of mankind’.52  Nevertheless, the 
character of sociability, and its role in the formation of national societies, was a prominent 
theme in several of his writings from the early 1750s onwards.  Kames’s most systematic 
contribution to the debate about sociability and the foundations of morality was his Essays on 
the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, first published in 1751, and revised in 1758 
and 1779.
53
  In the important second essay of this work, Kames engaged critically with the 
moral theories of both Hutcheson and Hume, and in later editions criticised Rousseau’s 
radical denial of natural sociability and his emphasis on self-love as a principle of morality.
54
  
As we shall see, the complex depiction of sociability set out in this work had some relevance 
for his account of patriotism.  A more substantial contribution to the specific topic of 
patriotism appeared in Kames’s much larger Sketches of the History of Man, a work that first 
appeared in 1774 and had a wide European reception.  Often seen as a key contribution to 
Scottish discussions about race, diversity and the history of human societies, the Sketches was 
also a serious analytical account of the moral foundations of patriotism.
55
  One of the reasons 
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for the centrality of patriotism in the work stems from Kames’s immediate worries about its 
absence in Britain, which he saw as part of the wider crisis undermining the British state in 
the 1770s.  His theoretical reflections on the foundations and scope of national loyalties were 
thus connected to concerns about the threats to the stability of the British constitution, which 
he saw as imperilled by a combination of ‘luxury’, corruption, and the misguided republican 
politics driving the American colonists towards independence.
56
  As Kames wrote in the 
Preface to the second part of the work, patriotism was the ‘corner-stone of civil society’, and 
‘no nation ever became great and powerful without it’.57 
 
Kames tackled the connection between sociability and patriotism in the sketch entitled 
‘Appetite for Society – Origin of National Societies.’  He took the basic fact of human 
sociability for granted, loosely echoing Aristotle’s Politics in claiming that man was ‘chief of 
the terrestrial creation’ when linked with others in society, yet the ‘most helpless and folorn’ 
when in a solitary state.
58
  A more difficult question was whether sociability embraced ‘the 
whole species’ or was ‘in any manner limited’.59  Kames straightforwardly denied that human 
beings, or any other animals for that matter, had an appetite for associating with the entire 
species.  Rather, mankind had always been divided into small-scale tribes and societies.  This 
could even be seen in large territorial states like the Roman Empire, in which smaller-scale 
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‘orders, associations, fraternities and divisions’ tended to emerge naturally.60  This claim 
about the limited character of human sociability supported Kames’s predilection for small 
states, something he shared with Fletcher, Hutcheson and other Scottish writers.
61
 
 
Kames also noted the strength of the ‘aversions’ that characterised relations between 
independent societies.  He emphasised this point very strongly in the ‘Preliminary Discourse’ 
to the Sketches as a whole, noting that there was ‘no propensity in human nature more general 
than aversion to strangers.’62  His ‘natural history of man’ was designed, in part, to support 
this central claim about the force of inter-societal aversion.  The natives of Greenland 
‘consider the rest of mankind as a different race, with whom they reject all society’.  Among 
the Romans, the same word (hostis) was used for both stranger and enemy.
63
  Clusters of 
small republics, such as those of Renaissance Tuscany, were characterised by ‘mutual hatred, 
usual between nations in close neighbourhood’.64  Moreover, the strength of aversion was 
directly proportionate to the strength of patriotic loyalty.  As Kames declared, ‘nations the 
most remarkable for patriotism, are equally remarkable for aversion to strangers’, a comment 
which applied to the Greeks, the Romans, the Jews, and the English.  These points meant that 
Kames’s Sketches shared a similar intellectual framework with Ferguson’s Essay. 
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Kames’s insistence on the strength of the principle of aversion in human nature had a number 
of broader implications.  First and foremost, it was part of a wider emphasis on the ‘unsocial’ 
propensities of human nature.  According to Kames, man was a ‘compound of principles and 
passions, some social, some dissocial.’65  Nevertheless, this compound structure was a crucial 
part of nature’s providential purpose for humanity (there are some resemblances here with 
Kant’s view that unsocial sociability formed part of a ‘hidden plan of nature’).66  The fact that 
human sociability was limited to the formation of small-scale societies served beneficial 
purposes: ‘Every work of Providence contributes to some good end: a small tribe is sufficient 
for mutual defence; and a very large tribe would find difficulty in procuring subsistence.’67  
Furthermore, a world of perfect concord and affection – a world purged of unsociable 
passions – would in effect deprive human beings of the stimulus necessary for the forging of 
the virtues: ‘scarce any motive to action would remain; and man, reduced to a lethargic state, 
would rival no being above an oister or a sensitive plant.’  Seen from this angle, a condition 
of universal peace, concord, and security was by no means the best terrain for the flourishing 
of human virtues.  At this point Kames made an interestingly ambiguous comment on 
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees.  He noted that Mandeville had indeed shown that private 
vices could be considered as public benefits.  But, Kames thought, Mandeville’s triumph 
would have been greater had he shown ‘that selfish and dissocial vices promote the most 
elevated virtues; and that, if such vices were eradicated, man would be a grovelling and 
contemptible being’.  There is a sense here in which Kames was elaborating a theodicy, in 
which the existence of ‘evils’ in human life were viewed providentially as essential to the 
‘improvement of our faculties and passions’.68 
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A second implication of Kames’s argument was that the philosophical proponents of 
mankind’s extensive sociability had erred in identifying a ‘moral duty’ of universal 
benevolence.  Here he was criticising the third Earl of Shaftesbury as well as Hutcheson, both 
of whom he interpreted as defending an unrealistic conception of the scope of human 
benevolence.  This point was a development of the critique of universal benevolence that he 
had already presented in the Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion.  In 
the Essays, Kames had insisted that a sense of universal benevolence was not natural to man 
in any obvious sense.  He criticised Shaftesbury for suggesting that unless benevolence be 
‘entire and directed to the whole species, it is not benevolence at all.’69  Although in the 
Essays Kames did accept the existence of a kind of universal benevolence, grounded on the 
mind’s capacity for extending partial affections to abstract terms (like ‘country’ or 
‘mankind’), the argument in the Sketches remained dismissive of the idea: ‘From the 
foregoing deduction, universal benevolence, inculcated by several writers as a moral duty, is 
discovered to have no foundation in the nature of man.  Our appetite for society is limited, 
and our duty must be limited in proportion.’70  This conception of sociability also 
contradicted Hutcheson’s gravitational metaphor of universal benevolence as it extended 
across mankind.  As I noted above, Hutcheson saw sociability in quasi-Stoic terms as 
encompassing the entire human community, and only gently weakening as it spread outwards 
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through the various ‘Systems’ that made up the largest ‘System’ of mankind.  For Kames, by 
contrast, animosity was at its strongest among immediate neighbours: the ‘nearer they are to 
one another, the greater is their mutual rancour and animosity’.71 
 
 
6. Kames on patriotism, war and peace 
 
Kames’s emphasis on the limited extent of sociable affections, and his corresponding 
insistence on the strength of ‘aversions’ in human nature, ultimately underpinned a 
comprehensive rejection of the cosmopolitan ideals of peace and international concord.  The 
most dramatic expression of his argument in this respect was the sketch entitled ‘War and 
Peace compared’, which contained a full-scale attack on the prominent eighteenth-century 
idea of Europe as constituted by peaceful commercial states.  Kames worked out further 
details of his thinking about patriotism and the international order in the sketches entitled 
‘Great and Small States Compared’ and ‘The Rise and Fall of Patriotism.’  The fundamental 
arguments that he developed in these pieces centred on the primacy of patriotism, which he 
saw as the key to maintaining the stability, liberty and duration of states.  It was this 
commitment to patriotism that ultimately led Kames to defend the vital importance of 
national enmities, and even war, as the key to maintaining the moral and political health of 
modern Europe. 
 
Kames’s most explicit reflections on the love of country were set out in the sketch entitled 
‘Rise and Fall of Patriotism’, in which he analysed the foundations of what he called amor 
patriae.  This was essentially a theory of republican patriotism, in which a commitment to a 
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free constitution was seen as the fundamental mechanism for maintaining patriotic feelings.  
Patriotism depended on the emergence of a common language and the possession of a shared 
territory (patria), but it was far more than a shared affection for a familiar locality.  Rather, 
following Cicero’s De Officiis, Kames explained that patriotism was a true love of one’s 
country and one’s fellow citizens, and represented the highest expression of the social 
affections.  It was the distinctive characteristic of a ‘people intimately connected by regular 
government, by husbandry, by commerce, and by a common interest.’  Its effect was to 
command esteem, to inspire virtue, and to strengthen morals among a people.
72
  Kames went 
on to specify a number of criteria that favoured the maintenance of patriotism among states, 
and even went so far as to claim that forms of government ought to be judged on their 
capacity to inspire patriotic sentiment.
73
  Many of his ideas looked back to standard themes 
within the civic humanist tradition of political thought.  Equal citizenship was significant: the 
the Roman republic only developed true patriotism after the legal distinction between 
plebeian and patrician had been abolished.
74
  Rotation of offices, which ensured that office-
holders competed for the approbation of their fellow citizens, was salutary.
75
  Just as 
importantly, patriotism was more easily preserved in small states than in extensive 
monarchies or empires: ‘patriotism is vigorous in small states; and hatred to neighbouring 
states, no less so: both vanish in a great monarchy.’76  Once again, here Kames echoed 
Ferguson in thinking that the strength of national loyalties was directly tied to the strength of 
‘hatreds’ towards foreigners or enemies. 
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Kames’s explanation for the ‘rise and fall’ of patriotism was patterned upon a broader story 
about the rise and fall of the sociable affections as societies progressed from the savage to the 
civilized state.  He first described this in a sketch entitled ‘Manners’, which contained an 
embryonic conjectural history of the rise and decline of patriotism.  According to Kames, 
patriotism and the sociable affections were at their strongest during the intermediate stages of 
social progress, whereas both very primitive and very civilized states were marked by high 
levels of selfishness: 
 
In the original state of hunters, there being little connection among individuals, every 
man minds his own concerns, and selfishness governs.  The discovery that hunting is 
best carried on in company, promotes some degree of society in that state: it gains 
ground in the shepherd state, and makes a capital figure where husbandry and 
commerce flourish.  Private concord is promoted by social affection; and a nation is 
prosperous in proportion as the amor patriae prevails.  But wealth, acquired whether 
by conquest or commerce, is productive of luxury, and every species of sensuality.  
As these increase, social affections decline, and at last vanish…And thus, in the 
progress of manners, men end as they began: selfishness is no less eminent in the last 
and most polished state of society, than in the first and most rude state.
77
 
 
Kames added to this in the sketch on the rise and fall of patriotism by claiming that patriotism 
was best underpinned by struggle, emulation and rivalry.  Nothing was more favourable to 
patriotism than the successful struggles for liberty made by citizens against domestic tyrants 
or foreign oppressors.  A ‘nation in that state resembles a comet, which, in passing near the 
                                                          
77
  Kames, Sketches, I, 178-9, 202-04.  
30 
 
sun, has been much heated, and continues full of motion.’78  The struggles of small states for 
liberty or independence were followed by rapid advances in the fine arts, sciences, and public 
institutions.  Purely domestic competition among equals for honours, glory and prestige was 
also a significant source of patriotic virtue: 
 
One who makes a figure rouses emulation in all: one catches fire from another, and 
the national spirit flourishes: classical works are composed, and useful discoveries 
made in every art and science.
79
 
 
On the other hand, patriotism inevitably declined among ‘stationary’ societies.  Here Kames 
cited a traditional list of stagnating trading republics (Venice, Portugal, the Dutch Republic), 
who had been overtaken in trade and power by more patriotically-motivated successors.  A 
similar fate awaited Britain, with its increasingly corrupt East India Company.
80
  Patriotism, 
finally, was undermined by the selfishness generated by inequality and luxury.  The 
selfishness produced by luxury, by ‘ingrossing the whole soul, eradicates patriotism, and 
leaves not a cranny for social virtue.’81  
 
It is perhaps worth underlining that Kames’s call for a revival of patriotism in Britain was by 
no means intended to promote any kind of independent Scottish nationhood.  Like other 
variants of ‘north British’ patriotism, Kames’s conception of patriotism was not incompatible 
with an admiration of English institutions and their effectiveness in promoting the 
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modernization of Scotland.
82
  The thrust of his argument in the Sketches underlined the 
urgent need of retaining the British union, especially given the dangerous centrifugal 
pressures placed upon the state by the factious American colonists.  In the course of his 
discussion, Kames developed an argument about why a distinctively Scottish ‘national spirit’ 
would flourish best in the framework of a larger British union.  He condemned the Union of 
Crowns of 1603 as destroying Scottish patriotism: ‘the union of the two crowns had 
introduced despotism into Scotland, which sunk the genius of the people, and rendered them 
heartless and indolent.’83  The 1707 Union, by contrast, initiated a sustained revival of liberty 
and patriotism.  By converting the English and the Scots into a single people, the Union made 
it possible for the Scots to abandon their traditional enmities towards the English and to 
engage in more productive forms of national emulation: 
 
Liberty, indeed, and many other advantages, were procured to them by the union of 
the two kingdoms; but these salutary effects were long suspended by mutual enmity, 
such as commonly subsists between neighbouring nations.  Enmity wore away 
gradually, and the eyes of the Scots were opened to the advantages of their present 
condition: the national spirit was roused to emulate and excel: talents were exerted, 
hitherto latent; and Scotland, at present, makes a figure in arts and sciences, above 
what it ever made while an independent kingdom.
84
 
 
The passage suggests that Kames believed that productive forms of national emulation could 
take place between two national groups in the context of a single political state. 
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The most striking consequence of Kames’s fixation on maintaining the patriotic vigour of 
states was the full-blown critique of ‘perpetual peace’ he outlined in the sketch ‘War and 
Peace compared’.  This sketch, which focused on the dangers posed by stagnation in pacific 
commercial states, was a direct consequence of Kames’s underlying theory of sociability and 
his view that mankind’s unsociable passions formed part of a harmonious providential order.  
He had already hinted towards this point in a comment at the end of the sketch on the ‘Origin 
of Nations’, in which he attacked a passage in the comte de Buffon’s Histoire Naturelle, in 
which Buffon had lamented the destructive consequences of discord and war and prayed for 
the establishment of a new, pacific golden age.  From Kames’s point of view, Buffon’s vision 
of a golden age of peace and concord failed to recognise that the ‘jumble of good and ill, 
malice mixed with benevolence, friendship alloyed with fraud, peace with alarms of war’ 
existing in the world was a crucial part of God’s providential design for mankind.85  Kames 
developed this perspective in the sketch on war and peace by highlighting the dangers of 
combining wealth, peace and security for prolonged periods.  Man, he wrote, ‘by constant 
prosperity and peace, degenerates into a mean, impotent, and selfish animal.’86  The 
consequences of commercial peace for states were equally severe.  Kames argued that 
Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic and Japan had all been destroyed by the ‘poison of 
perpetual peace and security.’  He even condemned the famous ‘Grand Design’ of the French 
king Henry IV (1553-1610) and his minister, the duc de Sully (1560-1641), as a project of 
unmitigated folly.  His view seems to have been that the refashioning of Europe into a kind of 
pacific confederation would have destroyed the military preparedness, or vigilance, produced 
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by the threat of war among European states.  This, he implied, would have rendered Europe 
vulnerable to an invasion from more militaristic states and empires in the east: ‘Conquest, in 
a retrograde motion, would have directed its progress from the east to the west.’87  His 
conclusions to this section ran in parallel with his broader view of the providential logic of 
mankind’s unsociable propensities: 
  
But war is necessary for man, being a school for improving every manly virtue; and 
Providence renders kings blind to their true interest, in order that war may sometimes 
take place.  To rely upon Providence in the government of this world, is the wisdom 
of man. 
Upon the whole, perpetual war is bad, because it converts men into beasts of prey; 
perpetual peace is worse, because it converts men into beasts of burden.  To prevent 
such woful degeneracy on both hands, war and peace alternately are the only effectual 
means; and these means are adopted by Providence.
88
 
 
Kames’s explicit justification of war as as a providential school for virtue and civilization 
was perhaps the most extreme expression of the language of ‘unsociable’ patriotism in 
eighteenth-century Scotland.  Nevertheless, he offered one mitigating observation.  Kames 
suggested that wars in the eighteenth century were no longer the scenes of violence and 
cruelty they had been in the past.  Like many other contemporary writers, he stressed that the 
progress of civilization had led to the establishment of laws of war and to a distinction 
between civilian and military personel.  This meant that wars between large modern states 
were no longer animated by the personal resentment that characterised ancient and barbarous 
wars, and could instead be seen as a positive force for the formation of virtue and courage: 
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One would imagine war to be a soil too rough for the growth of civilization; and yet it 
is not always an unkindly soil.  War between two small tribes is fierce and cruel: but a 
large state mitigates resentment, by directing it not against individuals, but against the 
state.  We know no enemies but those who are in arms: we have no resentment against 
others, but rather find a pleasure in treating them with humanity.  Cruelty, having thus 
in war few individuals for its object, naturally subsides; and magnanimity in its stead 
transforms soldiers from brutes to heroes.
89
 
 
Kames concluded that ‘war carried on in that manner, would, from desolation and horror, be 
converted into a fair field for acquiring true military glory, and for exercising every manly 
virtue.’90 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The language of ‘unsociable’ patriotism that ran through the writings of Ferguson and Kames 
represents a significant contribution to Enlightenment debates about the causes of political 
association, the history of civilization and the prospect of reforming the eighteenth-century 
state system.  Grounded on the insight that sociability was a principle of division as well as 
union – and that the human species was as much disposed to ‘opposition’ or ‘aversion’ as it 
was to ‘friendship’ or ‘concert’ – their accounts must be distinguished from two prominent 
alternative eighteenth-century perspectives on sociability.  On the one hand, Ferguson’s and 
Kames’s insistence that humans were naturally sociable distinguished their thinking from that 
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of Hobbes and Rousseau, both of whom had sought to undercut the idea of a pre-political 
principle of human association.  On the other hand, their central emphasis on antagonism, 
enmity and hostility distinguished their accounts from the mainstream of eighteenth-century 
theorists of ‘sociable patriotism’, who tended to underplay the divisiveness and dissension to 
which human nature was prone.  Furthermore, neither Ferguson nor Kames can be 
assimilated to the most prominent eighteenth-century conceptions of cosmopolitanism.  Their 
strong claims about the permanence of national rivalship or antagonism made them sceptical 
of any reconciliation between the ‘national interest’ and the ‘interest of mankind’ or, what 
amounted to the same thing, of separating patriotism from national animosity.  Furthermore, 
both thinkers were deeply opposed to what recent scholarship has termed ‘commercial’ 
cosmopolitanism, the idea that peaceful commerce, grounded on the alleged integrative 
sociability of markets, could ultimately help to pacify international relations.
91
  Seen from 
that perspective, Ferguson and Kames were important critics of both cosmopolitan 
republicanism as well as the Enlightenment ideal of doux commerce. 
 
By way of conclusion, it is perhaps worth emphasising that this line of thinking was by no 
means a peculiarity of eighteenth-century Scottish thought.  Rather, similar ideas about the 
importance of national rivalry in sustaining patriotism and vigilance were put forward by 
many European thinkers in the second half of the eighteenth century.  Among these was the 
French writer, the abbé Mably, who referred explicitly to the positive effects of ‘jealousy and 
discord’ in forestalling the enervation of the ancient Greek republics.92  The young Swiss 
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historian, Johannes von Müller, made a similar claim about the priority of patriotism over 
cosmopolitanism in his Allgemeine Aussicht über die Bundesrepublik im Schweizerland, an 
account of the moral and political foundations of Swiss republican politics written in 
manuscript in 1776-77.  Müller, who was a close reader of Ferguson’s Essay, argued that the 
partiality (Parteilichkeit) of states towards foreigners should not be condemned but rather 
recognised as a key source of domestic concord and patriotic identity.  In line with this view, 
he identified the citizens of ancient Sparta as exemplifying the priority of patriotism over 
cosmopolitanism, claiming that if the ‘Lacedaemonians had been what we call world citizens, 
rather than Spartan citizens, they would never have died for their fatherland.’93  Furthermore, 
as Eva Piirimäe has recently shown, Ferguson’s account of agonistic rivalry was an important 
influence on Johann Gottfried Herder’s qualified rehabilitation of the integrative capacity of 
national prejudices.
94
  Other scholars have detected echoes of Ferguson’s position in Hegel’s 
early writings on the German constitution (1798-1802) and on natural law (1802-1803), both 
of which offered a partial revaluation of war as a counterweight against the stagnation and 
atomism produced by perpetual peace.
95
  When placed in this perspective, Ferguson’s and 
Kames’s own accounts of mankind’s unsociable proclivities and their positive role in 
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sustaining the political cohesion and martial character of nations can be recognised as 
distinctive Scottish variants on a wider eighteenth-century theme. 
